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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
l'LLFTOX

~l.

BOvVDEN,
Rcspond('llf,
-v:::;.-

Case No. 8054

rrHE DEX\.El{ AKD RIO GRANDE
\\'ESTERX RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,

Appella;nt.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE11ENT OF THE CASE
Xumht>r~

in parenthesis refer to pages of the record.

The partie:s will be referred to as in the Court below.
Defendant's brief does not adequately present the
faet~ to assure a proper consideration of the correctness
of the trial court's order in granting plaintiff a new trial.
In several instances defendant misstates the testimony.
\\'e therefore feel it neee~sar~· to present the facts which
an· material to the instructions questioned and to an
understanding of the case.
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Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a brakeman,
and on the 21st day of December, 1951 was performing
the duties of a head brakeman on an eastbound freight
train from Salt Lake City to Helper, Utah (10, 15).
At Soldier Summit, l~tah is located the summit of
mountains over \vhich it was necessary to puH the train
(118). From Soldier Summit to Helper is downgrade
and in order to properly control the train it is necessary
to set up what are known as retainers. These would be
set up on about :35 .cars immediately behind the engine.
It was plaintiff's duty to perform this task. Plaintiff's
train arrived at Soldier Summit in the early morning
hours. It was dark. Another eastbound train was to pass
the freight train. To accon1plish this it was necessary
to run the freight train into a passing track at Soldier
Sununit (1-!). Plaintiff \vould have to get out of the engine cab, where he was riding, and set up each of the 35
retainers. To save delay he started to climb down the
gang,vay ladder on the south side so that as soon as the
stop was made he could get off (15). As he stepped
on the second step from the bottmn his right leg, about
half way between the ankle and knee, was caught by snow
alongside the 'track (17). The engine was going between
-± and 5 miles an hour (18). As he stood on this ladder
he was unable to see beyond the head end of the engine
and could only see flying snow and steam (38, 63). The
snow swept his feet from the ladder and he was dragged
along for some little distance as he clung to the ladder.
He was finally forced to lelt go (18). In describing the
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~nowbank,

which had been responsible for his fall, plaintiff te~tified (20) :

"Q. K ow, as you \\·ere going back along
there, did you 111ake any observation of the condition of the snow along the side of the track'?
"~-\.. Ye8, I did; I looked at the snowbank
Yery closely.

"Q.
please.

Describe to the jury what you saw there,

"A. \Yell, 1ny estimate of the snow was from
three to four feet high, with a straight surface
bank on it, which was right up ag'in the cars:
couldn't get between it and the car. I walked on
top of the snowbank, and was coming back, putting
up retainers both \Ya ys.

"Q.

Keep your voice up.

''~\. \Yell, snow was very solid and hadn'twasn't no ten1porary snow there; been there for
several days in the way it was solid.

· 'Q.

Did it look like it was drifting, also t

"A.

No, it didn't.

"Q.

\Vere there any marks on it

~Ton

could

tell?
''A.
of it.

''Q.

Yes, there was some marks in the bank
\Vhat kind of 1narks ~

"A. \Vell, which showed the side of the engine, or different parts of the engine was dragging.
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"Q.

Was

what~

"A. Drug the bank, yes.
"Q. You walked back the 35 cars, then walked forward fixing the retainers~
''A.

Yes."

.\:-; l'ar as plaintiff kn<·w, the tracks there were clear
and he presumed that there was no close clearance and
he relied upon that pr<>~lllll)Jtion (37, 70). The conductor
t<'~t i l'ie<l that he would not expect an impairment of clear::uw<> to a man standing on the ladder of an engine in the
position of plaintiff ( R. 87).
The defendant operated snowplows for the purpose
of clearing 1the tracks at Soldier Summit. One of the
purpo:-es of clearing the snow away from the tracks ,,·as
to make sufficient clearance for men to ride on the side
of the cars, and it was known that men worked along the
south side of this passing track (124). While cleaning the
track of snow it is necessary to pull in the wings of the
plow to avoid some obstructions along the side of the
track. In this particular case there was a battery box
close enough to the track so as to require a pulling in
of the wings (78, 81, 1:21, 1:23).
It was necessary to clean around switch stands and
battery boxes with a bulldozer in order to afford sufficient clearance for men working on the trains (122, 123).

The defendant knew that by pulling in the wings an area
would be left where there would be insufficient clear-
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ance to pennit 1nen to work on the trains with safety
( 1:2-t, 1:23). In sending the train through this passing
track no warning· was given to the n1en on the train that
they could expect close clearance ( 128). As n1atter of
fact, it was not necessary to send the train down into
this area without giving a warning or until the snow had
been safely cleared to permit the men to work in safety
(125 ).

Defendant's Roadmaster, W. R. Thomson, was in
charge of the work of cleaning snow from the tracks at
Soldier Sunm1it (114, 115).
There was no evidence that snow crews were working on the tracks at the time plaintiff was injured and no
evidence that the bank of snow, responsible for plaintiff's
injuries, was drifted snow.
The case was submitted to the jury upon the erroneous instructions and a verdict of "No Cause of Action"
resulted.
STATE~Il£1\T

OF

POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 9.

11/aster is charged with knowledge of conditions
at place where he sends his servants to work
a11d sen·a.nt is not required to prove knowledge of ~tnsafe
condition.
1.

e.1~isting
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:2. 111 aster i~ charged as matter of law with knowledge acquired by his servants and with knowledge of unsafe condition created by his servants.

:L Where defendant is charged with knowledge as
muller of law, to instruct jury it must find existence of
knmdedge before it can find liability constitutes pre.i uri icinl error.

-1.

The giving of subdhision (2) of Instruction No.

9 conslifllfed prejndicial error.

G. Contentions and authorities of defendant ansu·e rl'd and a nul !J zed.

POIKT II.
THE TRIAL .COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

ARGF:JIENT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 9.

One of the grounds upon which plaintiff sought reco,Tery was that defendant failed to exercise reasonable
care to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work.
Plaintiff requested an instruction on this subject,
which the court in substance gave as its Instruction No. 6
(207) :

"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant failed to use reasonable
care to furnish plaintiff a safe place to work in
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that the defendant in clearing the ~now from it~
tracks at Soldier\; Stumnit failed to elean the
tracks a sufficient distance to permit persons lawfully riding on the side of engines or cars to do so
in safety and without coming in contact wi th the
snow, then you are instructed that the defendant
was negligent, and if you shall further find that
such negligence proximately caused, in whole or in
part, injuries to plaintiff, then you should return
a verdict in fayor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant and award to plaintiff darnages as
in these instructions set forth."
1

r nder

this instruction the jury, to return a verdict
for plaintiff, was required to find that defendant in
clearing snow frmn its tracks failed to clear the tracks
a sufficient distance to permit persons riding on the
~ides of engines to do so \vith safety and without coming
in contact with the snow, and that such conduct was a
failure to use reasonable care in furnishing to plaintiff
a reasonably safe place to work. This is all a servant
need prove in order to establish the liability of a master
upon this ground.
At defendant's request, the trial court gave a further
instruction upon this subject as its Instruction No. 9,
which is set out at length on page 4 of the Brief of Appellant. Under that instruc'tion before the railroad could
be found negligent in failing to provide a safe place to
work, the jury must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the railroad knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that there was snow
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or otlH•r substance near the track at the point of the acci-

dPnt. This added an element with which defendant was
<'lla rg(~d as matter of law and no jury finding was neces~ary thereon.
Under B11b /j, Union l)ucijic R. Co., (Utah), 233 P.
:2d :~:~:2, a nwst(•J' is charged with knowledge of conditions
Pxi:-ding in places where it sends its servants to work.
.\ bo in this case the unsafe condition was created by
defendant'~ servants, including a roadmaster, and these
;-;erynnts had knowledge of the existence of the snowbank.
Ilen(·p, defendant was charged as matter of law with
knowledge of conditions there existing.
1. Jla.stcr is charged zcith knowledge of conditions
c.ristin_q at place zdzere he sends his servants to work
aJid serumt is not required to prot·e knowledge of wnsafe
couditioll.

In the last dozen years the Supreme Courrt of the
l ~ nited States has given a liberal construction to the Fed-

eral Employers' Liability Act and has been very careful
to see that railroad workers are afforded protection under that Act. One of the cases within this period wherein
the court addresses itself to the proposition of a safe
place to work is Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry. Inc., 319 U.S.
350, 352, 353, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 1063, 87 L. Ed. 1444. In setting forth the principles involved in this very important
duty of a master, the court stated:
"Sec. 1 of the Act makes the carrier liablP
in damages for any injury or death 'resulting
in whole or in part from the negligence' of any of
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it:s "offieer:s, agent:s, Ol' ClllployeP8'. r_rhe righb
whirh the Act ereates are federal rights protected
bY federal rather than local rules of law·. * * *
~-\nd those federal rules have been largely fashioned fr01n the conunon law * * * except as Congress
has written into the 4.\et different standards. * * "'
~lt conunon law the duty of the employer to use
reasonable care in furnishing his employees with
a safe place to work was plain. * * * As stated by
this Court in the Patton case it is a duty whirh
bec01nes "more in1perative' as the risk increases.
'Reasonable care becon1es, then, a den1and of higher supremary, and yet, in all cases it is a question
of the reasonableness of the care, reasonableness
depending upon the danger attending the place or
the Inachinery.' * * * It is that rule which obtains under the E1nployers' Liability Act. * * *
That duty of the carrier is a 'continuing one' * * *
from which the carrier, is not relieved by the fact
that the en1ployee's work at the place in question
is fleeting or infrequent."
The court cited and relied upon the earlier case of
Kreiglz

L

Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co., 214 U.S.

249, 29 S. Ct. 619, 621, 622, 53 L. Ed. 984. The court in
that case in describing this duty, stated:
"The duty of the master to use reasonable
diligence in providing a safe place for the men in
his e1nploy to work in and to carry on the business
of the Inaster for which they are engaged has been
so frequently applied in this court, and is now so
thoroughly settled, as to require but little reference to the cases in whirh the doctrine has been
declared.

* * *
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"Nevertheless, the duty of providing a reasonably safe place for the carrying on of the work
is a continuing one, and is discharged only when
the master furnishes and maintains a place of
that character. As late as Santa Fe & P. R. Co.
v. Holmes, 202 U. S. 438, 50 L. ed. 1094, 26 Sup.
(it. Rep. 676, it was declared: 'The duty is a continuing one and must he exercised whenever cir<'umstances demand it.'"
That dm;e <'learance constitutt-~ an unsafe place to
work i:-: estahli8hed by the case of Ellis 1.:. Union Pac. R.
( 'o., :t2!) l .S. (i-J.!), (jj S. ('t. 3!)--<, :J!)!), 91 L. Ed. 372, wherein the ('Ourt :-:tates:
T

"'* * * The nearness of the track to the building created an unsafe place for work."
ln none of the foregoing cases is there any requirement that the jury find the master had knowledge of the
dangerous condition of the premises in or onto which the
master sent his servant to perform work. A moments reflection will give the underlying reason. A master undertakes to send his servant into a certain place to work.
The master should determine and 1nake inquiry about
the conditions there in existence. If there is a dangerous condition existing it would be his duty to eliminate
such condition, warn the servant of its existence, or refuse to permit the servant to go into the area. There is
no reason why a master should be able to say that he
was not aware of a dangerous condition existing in a
place where he has sent his servant to perform a task
which would be financially beneficial to the master.
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Thi~ is nwre clearly true in the ease at bar than in
the ordinary ea~e. Here wa~ an obvious danger, a danger
created by serYant~ of the defendant in clearing snow
from the tracks and leaYing a bank of snow too rlose to
the tracks for safety.
~-\t

one time it may be that the courts required a
finding of either actual or constructive knowledge of
dangerous conditions. \Ye submit that is no longer the
law. This change is recognized in a recent article found
at 1:2 F.R.D. 13, entitled Federal Employers' Liability
..:\d, and written by B. Nathaniel Richter and Lois G.

Forer. At page 30 the authors state:

··* * * Nevertheless, under the F.E.L.A., the
unsafe condition of the car, locomotive, track,
roadbed or prernises may give rise to liability if
the jur·y infers that such unsafe conditions caused
the injuries con1plained of. Older cases required
notice by the carrier of the unsafe condition, before allowing the jury to find negligence.
"The duty to maintain a safe place is nondelegable and the carrier is responsible for any
injuries resulting therefrom even though it had
no control over the premises. The Supreme Court
has recently held that the unsafe conditions are of
themselves evidence of negligence and permit the
case to go to the jury if causation might be inferred.''
This Court has recognized that change in the recent
<'H~e of B1d.z r. Uniou Pacific R. Co. (Utah), 233 P. 2d
3:t~. In that case plaintiff was mnployed by defendant
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a~ a :-~\\'itdnnan and was riding the lead end of a cut of
<·ar:-~ being- :-~llove<l l1y

defendant on the tracks of the
Dt>nver Union r_rerminal Cmupan~', at Denver, Colorado.
I ~:l~g-ag<' trucks w<~re too close to the tracks to permit
a lllan to ride in ~afety on the side of the car in the posit ion ol' plaintiff. He was ~hoY<·d into these baggage
tnwk:-~ and n•(·<~iv<~<l injury. In ~tating the problem, this
( ~ourt :-:tat<·d (p. :~:~:n:
"As will hereinafter appear, the difficult
que:-:tion in this case is not whether the plaintiff
was furnished a safe place in which to work, but
whether defendant railroad should be held responsible for the conditions at the place of plaintiff's injury and the fact that the baggage trucks
were 1nisplaced too close to the tracks where plaintiff was required to perform his duties at the time
he got hurt."
The Court directly held that in the situation of the
!J 11 t z case defendant was charged with knowledge of the

physical conditions existing in a place to which defendant
sent its employees. The Court stated (p. 335):

"Defendant maintains that there is no basis
for either its actual or constructive knowledge of
the condition of danger which existed here. The
defendant is charged with knowledge of the physical conditions there existing including the tracks,
platform, the baggage trucks and the method of
their use and operation."
In addressing itself to the role of the employer in
these cases the Court also stated (p. 336):
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· ·* * * The en1ployer exPrci::::;e::::; exclusive choiee
both as to the place of work and control over
safetv factors. It is therefore not unreasonable
to ch~u·ge hin1 with the duty of providing a safe
place to work''
This case ::::;tands for the proposition that under the
Federal Employers' Liability ~\et a servant is not required to prove that the carrier had actual or constructive notice of an unsafe condition at the place he is injured, and the presumption is that the carrier has notice
since it controls places of work and the assign1nents
which the employee n1ust carry out.
The proof necessary to establish a safe place to work
<·ase is f'et forth as follows (p. 336) :
"This history, together \Yith the language
of the adjudicated cases, including the \Vilkerson
case itself, point to one inescapable conclusion:
The Supreme Court of the United States says
with unequivocal certainty that wherever a railroad employee under F.E.L.A. is injured in the
course of duty and there is any evidentiary basis
upon which reasonable minds could believe that
reasonable care Inight have required additional
safety measures which were not taken, and which
contributed in whole or in part to cause the injury, the case should be tried to a jury."
There is no requirement here of knowledge. There
was no testimony of any kind in the Butz case tending to
~how that defendant had any knowledge of the position
of the haggage trucks. This court of necessity held knowledge was not a required part of plaintiff's case.
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Tit<·re are two propositions present in the case at
hur, not pres<'n t in the JJ Ill.?, case, which rnake the case
at har even a stronger case for plaintiff. In the Butz
<·a:-;(' tltP t•tnploye(~ was sent to property of another and the
emplo~·er was still charged with the responsibility of its
<·ond i tion, whi I(' in the C'ase at bar the property upon
\\'hich plaintiff \\'as injured was the property of defendant <·:.uri<·r. ..:\!so, in the lJ !liz case there could be no way
of determining who placed the baggage trucks too close
to the traeks and it was assumed the trucks were left by
T<~nllinal Company employees. In the case at bar the
dose clearance could only have been treated l>y servants
of the defendant.
~Pl' also: Tr:rminal R. A.<;.<;'n. of St. Louis v. Fitzjolw, Hij F. 2d 41~~ (8 CCA); Shiffler 1:. Pennsylvania R.
( :o.J 1/(i F. :2d 368 (3 CCA); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
Ry. ( 'o. r. Gill, :217 F. :Zd 195 (5 CCA); Chicago, Rock Island & Poe. Ry. Co. c. I(ifer, 216 F. 2d 753 (10 CCA);
Trillium,) r Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 190 F. 2d 7-±-! (5
(_'(_'~-\).

In Sllifj'ler c. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, a directed
verdict for defendant was reversed although the court
disregarded eYidence of notice to the cornpany of the
conditions alleged to render the place of work unsafe.
In Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kifer,
supra, the plaintiff's ~ction was under Federal Employers' Liability Act and he sought recovery on the principle
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of failure to furnish a ~afe place to work. rrhe fact~ are
ahnost identieal with the Bntz case and a verdict for
plaintiff \Yas affinned. There was no proof of knowledp;P.
\Ye submit that under the foregoing authorities defendant \Yas charged \Yith knowledge of conditions existing at ~oldier Sununit. 4\s will hereinafter appear, it
was prejudicial error to permit the jun· to speculate
upon ·whether or not defendant had such knowledge.
:2. Jlaster is charged as mattr:r of laze 1rith kn01rledge acqnired by his sen·ants and n·ith knowledge of tmsafe condition crPated by his sen.·ants.
The defendant's roadmaster was in charge of the
,,·ork of cleaning snow from the tracks at Soldier Summit
(11-!, 113), and he knew that it was necessary to clean
around the switch stands and battery boxes with the bulldozer in order to afford sufficient clearance for 1nen
working on the trains (122, 123). He also knew that by
pulling in the ,,·ings of the snow plows an area would be
left where there would be insufficient clearance to permit
men to work on the trains with safety ( 124, 125). He
testified that one of the purposes of clearing the tracks
in this area was to make sufficient clearance for men to
work along the sides of trains ( 124). The testimony of
plaintiff is the only testimony concerning the type of
snow which drug hin1 from the engine. His testimony is
~d out in detail under the Statement of Facts. Suffice it
to say here he testified the snow appeared to have been
there for several days and it was not drifted snow.
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\\' e hen· lmYe conclusive and positive evidence that
the em plo~·t·t~s of defendant, under the supervision of its
Hoadmastt·r rehmm;on, created the close clearance by pulling- in t Itt~ wings of the snow plow and not clearing it a
~nfl'ieiPnt distan<~t~ for the safety of Inen riding the sides
()I' trains. Tit<' ca~e~ clearly hold that a master is charged
with tlw knowledge of his servants. lt seems almost trite
to ~ay it is only through servants that this defendant
railroad ('orporation could acquire knowledge of conditions at ~oldier ~ummit on this particular occasion. The
roadmaster knew of the conditions existing at Soldier
~ummit, and under the authorities this is the knowledge
of d('fendant. Field L·. Xortltu·est Steel Co., 67 Or. 126,
1:r> Pac. 320; Rogers v. Portland Lmnuer Co., 54 Or. 387,
103 Pac. 51-!; ,'-iclierer 'li. Danziger, 178 Cal. 253,173 Pac.
~.->;Hennig r. Car~tens Packing Co., 136 Or. 267,297 Pac.
1055; Juck~u11 c. Yak Jfining, Jlilling & Tunnel Co., 51
Colo. ;).) 1, 119 Pac. 1058.

r:rhe close clearance existing at Soldier Summit was
created by defendant. This being so, it is charged with
knowledge of the condition.

In Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oliphant, 172 Old.
635, 45 P. 2d 1077, 1081, the deceased was an electrician
who 'vas sent to repair a light switch. He climbed a pole
and was electrocuted. Plaintiff introduced testimony
that the electrical syste1n at that point was i1nproperly
constructed. In holding defendant charged with knowledge of the condition of this systen1 the court stated:
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.. \\~here the mnployer is guilty of negligence
a matter of law in creating a dangerous situation, knowledge of the existence of such situation
is in1puted to hin1 and it is his duty to notify his
en1ployee of such dangerous situation. 'It is the
dutY of the n1aster to \Yarn his employees of danger~ arising out of the progress of the work which
are known to hin1 and unknown to them, and this
is a nondelegable duty.' Thurlow et al. v. Failing
et al., 133 Okl. 277, 272 P. 368, 37~. And, under
such circumstances, \Ve see no reason why the
degree of skill possessed by the employee should
haYe any bearing on the question, in the absence
of notice."
a~

\Ye submit defendant \\·as charged with the knowledge of it~ roadmaster and other e1nployees in the area,
and if the clearance \vas close enough to catch a person on
the side of the engine, it was charged with knowledge of
that condition through its servants.

3. Where defendant is charged with knowledge as
matter of lazr, to instruct jury it must fimd existence of
knozcledge before it can find liability constitutes prejudicial error.
The giving of this instruction added materially to the
burden of plaintiff and tended to confuse the jury. The
instruction sub1nitted by plaintiff made no such requirement. It provided that before plaintiff could recover the
jury must find defendant created an unsafe condition.
In addition to the defendant creating an unsafe condition
it was necessary under this added instruction to find
that defendant had knowledge of the condition. This certainly was error.
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ln / J'll'!JUlllt

l:. ~<,'Lwulard

Coal Co., 50 utah G8:J, 168
Pa<'. 2(i(i, 2(i7, all action was brought for the death of a
miiiPI'. Tl1P <·vidence was undisputed that explosive gas
had been found in the mine more than two months before
the fatality. rrhe court instructed that it was a mine
known to generate such gas. This instruction was correct
al1<l tl}(· <·ou rt held that a trial court should not leave an
undisput<'d fad to 1Je determined by the jury, and stated:
1

"• • • The fact that explosive gas was found
in the mine was therefore an undisputed question,
and, that being so, no finding to the contrary could
have been truthfully wade by the jury. vVhere a
finding with respect to any essential fact must
Jwtessarily be in the affirmative, it is ordinarily
the duty of the court to declare the fact, and not
permit the jury to assume that they may find the
fact contrary to the undisputed evidence."

In TlwntJJSOJI

[~nion

Fi::;llrrman's Co-Op Packing Co.,

1 lS Or. -t:~(i, :233 Par. 695, an action ·was brought to re-

eovt'r for the death of plaintiff's daughter. She was employed

b~-

defendant and was killed while on an elevator

defendant had left in charge of a minor. The jury was
instructed that defendant could not be liable if deceased
\Yas in the elevator and attempted to operate it without
the knowledge of agents of defendant. This instruction
was held prejudicial error because the deceased daughter
was on the elevator at tl1e invitation of the minor, and
defendant was of necessity charged with the knowledge
its servant had acquired.
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\Ye ~ubmit that the gtYmg of
prejudicial error.

thi~

instruction was

±. The giring of Sltbdirisioll (.2) of Instruction No .
.9 co nsf it uted prejudicial error.
Before plaintiff could recover subdivision (:2) of this
in~trnction required that the jury find (1) defendant had
a rca~onablv sufficient tirne to elin1inate the snow, ( 2)
eould reasonably have eli1ninated it, and ( 3) defendant
failed to do it.
Here again \Ye have defendant's request piling element upon ele1nent, thereby increasing without end the
hurden placed upon plaintiff.
The jury could find that defendant did not have
time to eliminate the snow before plaintiff's train went
through the pn~~ing track hut because of the unsafe condition of the area reasonable care had not been exercised
to furnish a reasonably safe place to work. Defendant
did not need to send its train into this area at the precise
moment which it did. It could have waited until the area
had been made safe and in failing to do this it was negligent.
The trial court set forth three necessary factors to
find under the subdivision. The first and second are the
~ame,

though \\·orded differently. The trial court follow-

ing· defendant's request required both.

\Vhy~

This was

error and confusing to the jury.
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\\' e ~ub111it that subdivision (2) of this instruction
wa~ erroneou~ and giving it to the jury was prejudicial.

5. Contentions and a11thorities of defendant ansu:ererl and auuly.zed.
On page 10 of its brief defendant asserts the jury
mHloul)tt·dly found plaintiff's foot encountered "newly
dri l'h·d ~now that had accumulated during the early
morning hours along the side of the track." There is no
eYi(1Pil('(' to support any such finding. The only evidence
relating to the ~mowbank ~was that of plaintiff and there
wa~ no eviden<·e any drifted snow caught plaintiff.
Defendant C'untend:s the jury could very reasonably
have found defendant did not know of the existence of an
alleged close e learance and had no reasonable opportunity
to correct this condition. It contends the close clearance
C'Ould ha,~e been created by drifted sno\v. It contends
this was its theory.
The difficulty ,,·ith defendant's contentions above
outlined is that the instruction is not limited to drifted
snow close clearance. The instruction states unequivocally that in order for plaintiff to recover under any or
all conditions the jury must find as one of the elements
that defendant had actual constructive knowledge of the
elose clearance. This is not true if that close clearance
were created by defendant through its servants by pulling in the wings of the snowplow and leaving the snowbank too close to the engine for an en1ployee to ride safely
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on its ::;ide. This instruction created such a confusion
when eompared with Instruction No. 9 that a new trial
must be giYen so that a jury may be clearly and correctly
instructed on this Yery Yital subject.
The authorities cited by defendant, with the exception of the Butz case, supra, are not helpful.
In O'J[ara r. PeHnsylnwia R. Co., 95 F. 2d 762 (6
plaintiff had charge of a railroad station and
jumped frmn baggage trucks to the platfonn lighting on
a :-:quare headed bolt. The station platfonn \Yas between
t\\·o :-:treeb and served as a sidewalk for the public. How
long the bolt had been there and by whom it had been
placed could not be detern1ined from the evidence. The
eonrt express!~· distinguished the situation there presented from one where the accident occurred upon company property and to which only employees of defendant
\\·ould have access. This latter situation is the one pre~ented in the case at bar.
CC~-\),

Hatton v. N eu.: York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 261 Fed. 667
(1 CCA) was decided in 1919, and does not follow the
rule of the later cases. In that case ice on a station platform caused a plank to slip. There was no evidence that
an~·

agents of the defendant had knowledge of its ex-

istence. In the case at bar there was undisputed evidence
that defendant had knowledge of the snow and of the fact
that close clearance was left by pulling in the wings of
the :-;nowplow.
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Southern l(tJ. Co. v. Sleu.·u/rt, 11;') F. 2d 317 (8 8C~\),

involv<>d an <>ntirely different situation. 1,hen~ the arm
of the d<><·<>a~<>d pen; on was crushed bet \veen two coupler~.

Tlw injurieH were fatal. The jury was instructed
tit a 1 in the ah~Pll<'<· of evidence that deceased did not
w.;e the pin lifter mechanism on the coupler the law
prP~Illll<'d lH· did use it before going between the ends
ol' tl1<· <·:u::;. This instruction was held error. The case
i~ not even r<·Jttotely helpful here.
In ,'-,'cliil/i;tg c. /Jelazrare and H. R. Corp., 114 F. 2d
(i~l ( ~ CCA), plaintiff brakeman caught his foot in ties
and a car ran over his leg. The ties were two rails
welded together. Ordinarily the space between these
rai b was filled with cinder~, but in this particular case
there were no cinders there. The court held that defendant'~ only duty was adequate inspection and timely
repair. This is distinguished from the ca~e at bar in that
here the condition ·was created Ly the activities of defendant, while in the Sclzilliug case it \\·as not. Also, there
the court fails to give effect to the repeal of the fello-w
seiTant doctrine and held that knowledge of the train-

men who did not do track n1aintenance work was not
equivalent to notice to defendant. In the case at bar,
the roadmaster and employees under his supervision,
\dlO

would have knowledge of this condition at Soldier

Summit, were engaged in track 1naintenance work. A
recent case

directl~-

contrary to this case is Chicago,

Rock Island and Pac. R. Co. v. Gill, 217 F. 2d 195; Saun-
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dcr:-: r. Longricw, P. & X. Ry. Co .. 1()1 'Yn~h. :280, :2!)()
Pac. ~;~:), wn~ decided in 1931, and ·was based upon the
proposition that the plaintiff assumed the risk, a doctrine long since discarded by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

Another ground upon ·which plaintiff sought re('nn~r~~ was the negligent failure of defendant to ·warn
plaintiff of the insufficient clearance between the cars
or engine and the snowbank. At plaintiff's request, the
eonrt instructed the jun~ on this subject in the second
paragraph of it~ Instruction No.7 (208):
··If you shall find frmn a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant failed to warn
plaintiff that there was insufficient clearance
between the cars or engine and the snowbank at
the side of the tracks at Soldier's Sum1nit, and
that such failure constituted negligence, and that
~uch negligence proximately caused, in whole
or in part, injuries to plaintiff, then you should
return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.''
All of the ele1nents required are set forth in this
paragraph of the instruction. The court in giving In:-;tnwtion K o. 10, set forth at length on pages 4 and 5
the Brief of Appellant, adds a new and additional element necessary for plaintiff to establish in order to
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l'l'<'<)\'Pl'.

~uhdivi~ion (2) of this instruction requires

that thP .iury find the railroad knew, or by the exercise
ol' n·a~ona\,\(•

<'HI'(·

should have known, of the insufficient

<·l<·aratw<· aud ~hould reasonably have known that it
(·n·at<'d an appn·<·ial>l(~ ri:-;k of harm to railroad workPI':-:.

A1·<·ordiug t<,

tlH~

authorities cited under Subdivi-

:-;1<,11 ( :!) of l'oi11t J, det'(·ndant was charged as matter
of luw with
l't-1"\'allt:-

kllO\\

l<·d_:!·<· acquired by its servants. Its

\\'(Jrl.:ing in the area and clearing the tracks of

:-;How wuulJ <Jf n<·tt·;-;:-:ity know about close clearance left

by the111.

( Ht·\·. Ed.)

ln

~ ~'-J'/1 ,.a f111a" u uri

}J . •-J:.!, ~l'<·.

point i:-: stated

a~

Redfield on }..' egligence

:.!1\ the rule applicable to this

folio,,·:':

,.It is the duty of the n1aster to use reasonable care to provide for the servant, so far as
the work at which he is engaged will permit,
a reasonable safe and proper place in which to
do his work, and to that end, if the place may
become dangerous by reason of perils arising
fr01n the doing of other work pertaining to the
master's business, different from that in which
the particular servant is engaged, to give him
such warning of the additional dangers as will
enable him, in the exercise of reasonable care, to
avoid them, or to guard himself against them.''
Subdivision

(2)

of Instruction No. 10 requires

plaintiff to prove not only that plaintiff knew there was
insufficient clearance, but also that it "should reasonahl~· have known that it created an appreciable risk of
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hann to railroad workers." No jury finding should be
required on this proposition. The evidence

wa~

uncon-

tradicted that defendant\; ~l'lTants engaged in cleaning
snO\Y knew that trai1unen would use the south side of
the ea~tbonnd passing track ( 1:2i~, 124) and that one of
the purposes of making sufficient clearance was to permit trainmen to work along the south side in safety
(1~-l:).

It follo\\·s that if there was insufficient clearance

then there

\Ya~

appreciable risk of harn1 to railroad

workers and no jury finding was necessary on this
latter proposition.
\\~ e

submit that in the particulars stated the giving

of this instruction constituted prejudicial error.

CONCLUSION
The trial court who gave these instructions determined that he was in error in requiring the added element
of actual or constructive knowledge, particularly in the
instruction given at defendant's request relating to the
principle or doctrine of safe place to work.
\V e sub1nit that the trial court was correct in its
anal~·sis

of this instruction and correct in its conclusion

that the instruction was erroneously given.
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\Ve respectfully submit that the ord8r· of the trial
court granting to plaintiff a new trial in this case should
be affirmed and the

cas(~

returned to the District Court

for the purpose of permitting plaintiff to try his case
before a .Jury properly and correctly instructed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS
Counsel for Respondent

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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